Category Archives: Kenya taxation

Inside Kenya’s BBI (Building Bridges Initiative) Report.

Last week saw the release of a report from the Presidential Taskforce on the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), that was the result of a March 2018 ‘handshake’ between President Uhuru Kenyatta and former Prime Minister Raila Odinga who had led different parties into the 2017 Kenya general elections.

The document is sub-titled Building Bridges to a United Kenya: from a nation of blood ties to a nation of ideals and its authors claim to have incorporated the views of about 7,000 Kenyans from all 47 counties.

One of the summarized findings was that elections are too divisive- and the country’s economy gets three good years that are interrupted by two-year blocks of intense electioneering campaigns.

Anyway, on to an alphabetical look at some of the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI) Report clauses.

Anti-Money Laundering: A bank involved in corrupt transactions should be made to repay all the money laundered through it, with interest.

Audits: Devolve the Office of the Auditor-General to the Counties. Also, projects initiated in the final year of an electoral cycle should receive extra scrutiny from the Controller of Budget and all oversight authorities.

Capitalism: We have confused value extraction with capitalism(and) we as a people must build an economy that is dominated by value creation and not value extraction.

CCTV: Link private CCTV of hotels, shopping centres, and other highly trafficked sites to the National Police Service to deter terrorism and crime.

Cyclists: Every new road in an urban area should be legally required to also have a sidewalk for pedestrians and specified lanes for cyclists, with clear signage.

Doing Business Rankings (not the World Bank ones): Develop and launch a measure of ease of doing business for small Kenyan businesses and not just foreign investors. This should be a comparative assessment published annually by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics and broken down by counties, cities, and towns.

(Fighting) Corruption: One of the summarized findings was a need to reverse the Ndegwa Commission and ban all public officers from doing business with the government. Another is that no procurement officer should be at a post for more than two years.

e-Government: Make Kenya a 100% e-services nation by digitizing all Government services, processes, payment systems, and record-keeping. This should include the ability to offer Kenyans digital identities, e-health records and Kenyans should be able to vote digitally.

(Attitude to) Free Money: When money is known as ‘pesa ya serikali’ (Government money), it is something to plunder not respect; indeed, people who try to save public money are dismissed and even rebuked.

(Use of) Government Services: dubbed “skin in the game of leadership” – all Ministers and county executives and leaders should use the services that they manage on behalf of all Kenyans. E.g. the children of the Education Minister should attend public schools and the Health Minister should use public health facilities.

History (of Kenya): President Uhuru Kenyatta should commission an official accurate History of Kenya, going back 1,000 years, whose production will be led by an Office of the Historian resident in the National Archives.

(Digitization of) Land Records: Complete the digitization of land ownership and give the public access to the database. Also, map and publicize Government-owned land open for commercial leasing under simple and enforceable terms.

Loan Apps: Properly regulate loan apps which are driving up indebtedness of poor Kenyans to destructive effect with their shylock-level interest rates and borrowing from multiple platforms.

Marginalization: The marginalized should not marginalize others – strong evidence was presented that some communities that complained about marginalization at the national level were themselves guilty of marginalizing minorities in their respective counties.

Media: Kenya needs media that uplifts through investing in quality local content (and) should build programming around Kenyan histories and showing what is exceptional.

Mining: Concessional agreements, policies and regulations in mining and oil should be made public in an accessible manner, including clear accounting for the public participation and environmental impact assessments.

New bodies Proposed in the BBI Report:
• A Health Service Commission to look at the human resourcing in the counties.
• A unified and assertive food safety and regulatory body to ensure Kenyan food become safe.
• Nairobi be accorded a special status as a capital city that allows the National Government to maintain it as a capital city and as a diplomatic hub.
• A commission to address current boundary conflicts until they are solved.
• (Compel the) Private sector to form a national, non-profit foundation, chaired by the President, that provides mentoring and support to aspiring business owners aged 18–35. It should match the young entrepreneurs with a business development advisor and a nationwide network of volunteer mentors.
• A Government-run national lottery to replace the private betting industry (which is leading to hopelessness and greater poverty)
• A Sovereign Fund that allows for savings in case of emergencies or extraordinary circumstances.
• An Office of the Public Participation Rapporteur mandated to conduct all public participation on behalf of governmental entities at the national and devolved units.
• A Prime Minister, appointed by the President, from the majority party in Parliament.
• A Department of Happiness, Wellness, and Mental Health in the Ministry of Health.
• Baraza la Washauri: The President should benefit from the private advice of eminent, experienced, and honourable citizens serving as a Council of Advisors on a non-salaried basis.

NHIF: The National Hospital Insurance Fund administrative costs should be cut down to 5%-10%. Currently, this is at about 18%.

Privatization: Expedite the privatization of Government shareholding in assets not delivering value to the public and undertake parastatal reforms.
The findings are further summarized to include “parastatals carrying out County functions should be either wound up or restructured.”

Revenue allocation: Public resources should follow people not landmass. Health, agriculture, and service delivery are also most important that landmass.

Taxation: Have a “flat tax” for every income category above a living wage/income of Kshs 30,000 (~$300) – to reduce tax fraud, encourage compliance, and cut down on corruption in the assessment of taxes.

Tax-cuts:
• Minimize taxation of new and small businesses by giving them a tax holiday of at least 7 years as a support to youth entrepreneurship and job creation.
• Cut taxes in relation to Auditor-General audits .. money should remain in Kenyans’ pockets until there is more accountability and governance on its use at the National and County levels
• Also no double taxation and double regulation at the National and County level.

Wealth Declarations: These should be made public and all senior leaders should publish written statements on how they acquired wealth over Kshs 50 million (~$500,000) and have this available on government websites, along with details of shareholdings, partnerships, directorships etc.

(Reward) Whistleblowers: Offer a 5% share of proceeds recovered from anti-corruption prosecutions or actions to the whistleblower whose information is necessary to the success of the asset seizure or successful prosecution.

White-elephants: To stop the abandonment of incomplete projects with each change of administration, the Treasury should not release monies to the new Governor before obtaining a list of incomplete projects and a plan for their completion.

Way forward: In the BBI report, there is no mention about a public referendum, the TJRC report, and very little about land and historical injustices. It also does not address much on legislative issues such as the two-thirds gender rule, and disputes between the Senate and the National Assembly. Parliament breaks for a two-month Christmas holiday this week, during which the BBI debate is sure to be a topic of much discussion up to February 2020 and beyond.

Kenya Political Party Financing in 2019

What’s to be learnt about the state of political party finance in Kenya? Some parties have published their unofficial financial results for the year 2019.

Jubilee: The ruling party has income of  Kshs 339 million, that includes 240 million from the Political Parties Fund (PPF) and 98 million from members. They spent 80 million on rent, down from 90 million, 173M on general  expenses and 81 million on secretariat staff and executives.  They have 16 million of property

ODM: The main opposition party received Kshs 112 million from the Political Parties Fund, same as last year, and donations of 78M. They have also booked an astronomical accrued amount from the government of Kshs 6.47 billion. They spent 170 million on administrative expenses, 19M on campaigns, 11M on party policy, 10M on conferences, 3M on branch coordination and just 712,000 on civic education. The amount they are claiming for the government is also listed as a current asset and bumps up their balance sheet from 119 million last year, to 6.5 billion.

Other Parties: Meanwhile other parties have been silent on their finances, but are active in other areas. These include the former ruling party – Party of National Unity, which has changed its officials. New parties have been formed this year  include  Transformation National Alliance Party of Kenya (TNAP) with “money bills” as its party symbol, the Democratic Action Party Kenya and the National Ordinary People Empowerment Union (NOPEU).

Summary of results:

1. Party coalitions are dead:  The party coalitions put together for elections appear to have fallen apart. ODM has stopped making payments to its coalition partners and no longer provides for them as they did in their earlier accounts.

2 Expensive secretariats: The amount at Jubilee of 81M  is down from 141M last year and which was a sharp rise from 28M in the previous year. That may coincide with hiring for the 2017 election period. Usually, party activities go into a lull after elections, until the next election cycle. In Kenya, this is set for 2022 unless another constitutional referendum is engineered to happen before that by political leaders.  At ODM, their property assets went up from 8M to 185M. in September 2019 they relocated their headquarters from Orange house to Chungwa House ay Loiyangalani  Drive in Lavington.

Old Pic from the State House FB page

3. Parties IPO: ODM has sued the government for not paying it the amount of Kshs 6.4 billion which it says dates back to when parliament came up with the  political parties act.   

But the National Treasury has been saying it cannot afford  to fund the political parties to the tune of 0.3% of the budget as parliamentarians had their parties, without impeding their constitutional requirement  to also fund the county governments.  Treasury has been allocating Kshs 300 million instead of 3.6 billion a year to the Political Parties Fund.

4. If that payment ever materializes, ODM’s coalition partners, have stated that they will stake a claim for a slice of that windfall. 

Rethinking tax incentives in Kenya’s investment promotion efforts

A recent court ruling declaring the Kenya-Mauritius Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) void has sent Kenya back to the negotiating table with Mauritius. The court’s judgment is based on the fact that the DTAA was not properly ratified under Kenyan law. Kenya’s government argues that the treaty promotes investment and jobs; however, critics such as the Tax Justice Network Africa (TJNA), which filed this suit, argue that DTAAs rarely lead to any benefits for developing countries. TJNA argues that instead, they result in massive revenue leakage for African countries which outweighs incoming foreign direct investment (FDI).

Should countries, therefore, abandon the use of DTAAs? The answer more than likely lies in the middle: to bring real benefits to the economy and promote local market potential, countries should balance between the use DTAAs and other tax incentives such as special economic zones (SEZs).

Kenya’s DTAA with Mauritius was signed in 2014 with the hope of boosting foreign direct investment, but the benefits of the agreement were poorly defined from the outset. Similar to any policy, DTAAs must be rooted in clear and measurable objectives supported by equally clear policy levers to ensure that revenue generated from the resident country is not leaked through tax avoidance schemes like profit-shifting. Studies show that DTAAs signed between countries with asymmetric investment positions are less likely to lead to any benefits for developing countries. In the Netherlands, for example, DTAAs led to forgone revenue of at least USD 863 million for developing countries in 2011.

Given Kenya’s current budget deficit of USD 3.75 billion, it is critical that efforts to attract FDI such as DTAAs do not cannibalise local efforts to improve tax revenue. Numerous studies show that countries rarely achieve substantive FDI levels to make up for the revenue losses these DTAAs cause. The failed Kenya-Mauritius DTAA is not the first time a tax agreement with the island nation has been subject to controversy: in 2017, India reviewed its DTAA with Mauritius after reports showed that it had opened room for tax avoidance resulting in revenue leakage of about USD 600 million annually. In 2016 alone, Mauritian firms injected more than USD 50 million into the Kenyan economy, a 72 percent increase from 5 years prior. If the Dutch and Indian examples are any indication, Kenya could be losing far more. Lost corporate revenue is income that Kenya urgently needs to meet its development objectives. A shift to other tax incentives whose impact is more ascertainable may be more effective for many developing countries.

If the goal of DTAAs is to increase foreign investment in Kenya, they must be considered in conjunction with the broader ecosystem of policy instruments that can be used to increase tax revenues to achieve Kenya’s four priority pillars for economic growth. The government hopes to raise the manufacturing sector’s share of the GDP from 9% to 15%, and create 1.3 million jobs in this sector by 2022. To achieve this, governments should explore specific tax incentives that can provide direct benefits to these areas, such as special economic zones, which aim to maximise the “cluster effects” of activities through knowledge and supply chain integration, centralised access to critical infrastructure like roads and electricity, as well as enhanced support from local government.

Kenya, in making strides to use other tax incentives such as Special Economic Zones, should borrow lessons from its neighbours on reaping full benefits from SEZs. Rwanda, for example, has successfully leveraged SEZs to promote growth. In 2016, the Kigali Special Economic Zone (KSEZ) employed 2% of the country’s permanent employees, and accounted for 2.5% of all VAT reported sales. In Kenya, the government has already designated Mombasa, Kisumu, and Lamu as the future SEZs but to maximise their impact and avoid the development of enclaves, it is essential that firms in these SEZs interact with firms outside the zones and that the government ensures knowledge and best practices developed are shared across the economy.

Tax incentives alone will never be the sole factor attracting investors — to increase FDI, Kenya must continue to demonstrate strong market potential by providing business support and trade facilitation services. KPMG finds that Kenyan products are among the top four countries in Africa that score above the global average in terms of competitiveness on the international market; however, it still takes an average of 22 days to start a business — compared to 6.5 days in Egypt and 14 in Ghana — and poor availability of market data can complicate efforts at local expansion. To improve the country’s competitiveness, the Kenya Investment Authority should improve the availability of data for investors by working more closely with the Kenya Bureau of Statistics. Reducing business costs, for example, by bringing down the cost of imports for required goods or improving data quality to support manufacturing and value-added services will always outweigh lowering taxes.

The DTAA ruling prompts a careful re-examination of how to increase FDI without incurring unintended knock-on effects like tax avoidance. To do this, Kenya must enhance its capacity when negotiating bilateral agreements, and enact policies to support proper implementation of these agreements. In its use of tax incentives, it is critical that the scales are always tipped in Kenya’s favour. The impact of each incentive employed must be clear and measurable to ascertain that its benefits outweigh any associated costs.

A guest post by Bathsheba Asati and Faith Nyabuto of the Botho Emerging Markets Group. 

See also: The Kenyan Guide to Mauritius for business travelers.

Reading the Kenya Rugby tea leaves

The Kenya Rugby Union held its annual general meeting on March 20. On the agenda too was the election of officials, including a new Chairman.

Officially called the Kenya Rugby Football Union (KRU)  the AGM came after a tough year, for the sport. Kenya does relatively well in international rugby, with its colourful ‘Sevens’ team featured on television broadcasts and with a loyal fan following around the world. The sevens team is currently ranked number 14 (after finishing number 8 in 2018)  and sometimes features Collins Injera, the all-time top try scorer.

But the team and the sport is rankled with management and funding issues, and while some corporations have supported different rugby series, competitions, and programs, there are still issues of team selection, coaching support and player welfares. During one series in Paris, the sevens team covered up logo of their shirt-sponsor, Brand Kenya, in protest over not receiving their allowances by the time they started their matches, and that drew the wrath of Kenya’s Tourism Minister, Najib Balala, who angrily cancelled their sponsorship contract, only to reinstate it a few days later.

AGM: The meeting was held after members overruled a request from the Government for them to postpone the AGM. The financial accounts of the Kenya Rugby Football Union (KRU), audited by PFK auditors, were shared with members at the meeting.

What do they tell us about the state of rugby?

Income: The income for 2018 included national squad income of  92 million (down from 117M in 2017), annual competitions income of 80M (up from 17M in 2017), World Rugby 21M and World Rugby sevens team support of 20M. There was also other income from jersey sales of just Kshs 736,000.

The annual competition income included 35M from Radio Africa and 9M  from Stanbic. East African Breweries donated 24M and 15M in 2018 and 2017 respectively while tickets sales in both years were 5.5M and 11.6M respectively. 

Of the national squad income in 2017, 97% of that (Kshs 113 million) came from Sportpesa, who later withdrew all sponsorships in protest at the Government increasing taxes on sport betting companies.  The 2018 income was more balanced, with Kshs 52M from the Government, and 20M from Brand Kenya as, to their credit, the Government fulfilled a pledge, at least for rugby, to plug the hole left by the Sportpesa departure.

In 2018, they also got 18M from Bidco, and enjoyed use of a vehicle that was donated by Toyota Kenya and containers from Bollore Logistics. Sponsorship income in 2017 included Kshs 20M from Wananchi (Zuku), Tatu City 5M, 4M from Bidco and a 2M bonus payment from Sportpesa

Expenses: In 2018, Kshs 132 million was spent on national squad operations (comprising 65M for the sevens team and 57M for the 15’s team), and 38M on competitions (comprising 10M each for club subsidy and the Safari Sevens tournament, and 8M each for international matches and the national sevens circuit). On rugby development, 10M was spent while 40M went towards administrative expenses (including 21M of salaries and 6M million on marketing and agency – which was down from 20M in 2017).

OverallThe Kenya Rugby Football Union (KRU) took in Kshs 227 million in 2018 and spent the same amount to end with a Kshs 527,104 surplus. The year before it took in 212 million and spent 247 million, resulting in a deficit of Kshs 36 million.

KRU has an accumulated deficit of Kshs 61 million, on its balance sheet with current liabilities of Kshs 120 million far greater than its current assets of Kshs 47 million. KRU had a negative bank position of minus 1.9M in 2018 (comprising a cash balance of Kshs 661,822 and overdraft of 2.5 million. They are owed 47M in receivables but owe 118M in trade payables (62M) and accruals of (50M)

These items were flagged by the auditors who also noted that KRU does not have a tax exemption certificate and the Society has made no provision for the payment of corporate tax.

Elections and Way Forward: The campaign manifesto of Sasha Mutai, one of the candidates for Chairman, was circulated online a few weeks before the election. In it, he articulated his plans including, short-term ones of settling the KRU debt, encouraging more (tax-eligible) corporate sponsorships, ensuring salaries are paid on time, supporting programs to nurture more women and schools rugby, increasing broadcast coverage and improving player welfare (including providing health insurance). His long-term goals include building an affordable national rugby stadium at Kasarani and to have Kenya qualify for the 2023 Rugby World Cup in France.

After the votes were counted, George Gangla was elected to succeed Richard Omwela as the  Chairman of the Kenya Rugby Union. He received 33 votes against Sasha Mutai 20 and Asiko Owiro who got two votes.  Geoffrey Gangla is the CEO of Genghis Capital, an investment bank while Omwela is Chairman of Scangroup and a managing partner at a leading law firm – HH&M.

Jumia IPO – Prospectus Peek

Edit April 12: Jumia lists on the NYSE

EDIT March 29 2019:  Mastercard Europe SA has agreed to purchase 128;50.0 million of our ordinary shares in a concurrent private placement at a price per share equal to the euro equivalent of the IPO offering price per ordinary share. Based on an assumed IPO offering price of $14.50 per ADS, which is the midpoint of the price range set and an assumed exchange rate of $1.1325 per 128;1.00, this would be 7,810,364 ordinary shares (corresponding to 3,905,182 ADSs). We will receive the net proceeds from this Concurrent Private Placement.

  • Mastercard Europe SA has agreed to purchase €50 million of our ordinary shares in a concurrent private placement at a price per share equal to the euro equivalent of the initial public offering price per ordinary share.
  • Certain of our existing shareholders have the right to subscribe for additional ordinary shares at nominal value depending upon the initial public offering price and the number of shares placed in this offering. Assuming a placement of all offered ADSs at the midpoint of the price range, these existing shareholders may subscribe for 18,157,245 ordinary shares against payment of €18.2 million.
  • The chairperson of our supervisory board, Jonathan Klein, has indicated an interest in purchasing an aggregate of up to $1.0 million in ADSs in this offering at the IPO price.

Posted March 15 Reading the F-1 filing for Africa Internet Holding GmbH, the Africa e-commerce company that will now be known as Jumia Technologies AG after it applied to list its shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) under the symbol “JMIA”.

Not much about the management at Jumia has been shared since Rocket Internet was dissected in Bloomberg story on their formula for Africa.  “Rocket sends three people to a different country to start a business: a CEO, a CFO, and a COO. The CEO builds the team, does the marketing, and drives sales. The CFO manages the revenue growth and cash burn. The COO makes sure we have a big enough warehouse and that the packages get delivered… and .. (the brothers) didn’t feel bad about copying. They had this feeling like they have to make Germany great again, so they only care about building big companies.

Why Africa?: The company (Jumia) is Africa Internet Holdings, registered in Germany. Jumia sees Africa as a market with 1.2 billion people (Jumia is in countries with 55% of this population), GDP of $2 trillion and 453 million internet users (Jumia is in countries with 77% of these internet users) and (they) believe that this younger generation, born into an “online” world, is increasingly seeking access to a wider choice of food, consumer goods and entertainment options as it becomes increasingly connected to, and aware of, global consumer trends.

They now have 4 million active customers, 81,000 active sellers, handled 13 million packages in 2018 and had 54% of transactions done on Jumia Pay which they introduced in Nigeria in 2016 and Egypt in 2018.

Ownership: The company was incorporated in June 2012. Shareholders in December 2018 were Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings – MTN (31.28%), Rocket Internet (21.74%), Millicom (10.15%), AEH New Africa eCommerce I (8.86%), 6.06% each for Atlas Countries Support and AXA Africa Holding, Chelsea Wharf Holdings (5.51%), CDC Group (4.04%), Rocket Investment Funds (3.48%) and Goldman Sachs (2.83%). A new shareholder, Pernod Ricard, came on board investing €75 million cash in January for 7,105 shares which became 5.1 million shares in a capital increase in February 2019 and they are entitled to more shares if an IPO happens within 18 months of their investment.

Governance: Jumia has 2 Co-CEO’s – Jeremy Hodara and Sacha Poignonnec who are both co-founders of the Company. There is also Antoine Maillet-Mezeray, the CFO – and the three, who all reside in Germany, comprise the management board of the company.

As part of the IPO, a supervisory board has been formed and it includes Gilles Bogaert (CEO Pernod Ricard SA), and Andre Iguodala, an NBA player with the Golden State Warriors. Other are Blaise Judja-Sato Jonathan D. Klein, Angela Kaya Mwanza (UBS Private Wealth), Alioune Ndiaye  (CEO Orange Middle East and Africa), Matthew Odgers (MTN Group) and John Rittenhouse.

Employees: The Company has a total of 5,128 staff including 1,213 in Nigeria, 572 in Egypt, 686 in East Africa and 183 in South Africa. Also, an ESOP (stock option plan) was set up in 2019 that will award options to key management of Jumia. The three members of the management board had total compensation of €1.04 million in 2018, and the two co-CEO’s each have 2.2 million shares as underlying options that were granted in 2016.

Assets: The Company has no real estate. It is headquartered in Berlin where they lease office space along with other spaces in Dubai and Portugal. They also have leased warehouses in Lagos, Cairo, Nairobi, Casablanca, Abidjan, and Cape Town.

Significant subsidiaries are CART (Nigeria), ECART Ivory Coast, ECART Kenya, ECART Morocco and Jumia Egypt.

Financials: For 2018 they had revenue of €130 million. Of the revenue, €66 million from West Africa, €37.8 million from North Africa, €15 million from South Africa and €10.8 million from East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda – up from €4.6 million in 2017. In February 2016, they had exited Tanzania and sold their four Tanzania subsidiaries to co-CEO Hodara who wanted to run them himself.

In 2018, the goods they sold cost €84 million and Jumia also spent €94 million on administrative expenses (including €48 million on staff), €50 million logistics, €47 million on selling and advertising, and €22 million on IT expenses (including 12 million staff)

As a result, in the year 2018, they lost €169 million, compared to a loss in 2017 of €153 million. As at December 2018, the company had cash of €100 million and accumulated losses of €862 million.

Taxation: There are potential tax liabilities that have not been assessed over and above the €30 million in pending and resolved matters.  Their effective tax rate was 0.5% in 2018 and 7.4% in 2017.

The company has accumulated tax losses of €358 million including €145 million in Nigeria, €61 million in Egypt, €39 million in Kenya (~Kshs 4.5 billion), €28 million in South Africa and €25 million in Morocco.

Jumia Filing Matters: 

  • Filing costs about not confirmed but there will be a $12,120 SEC registration fee and an estimated $15,500 FINRA filing fee.
  • The public offer price is not known, but the maximum value after the listing is estimated to be $100 million.
  • Underwriters are Morgan Stanley, Citigroup Global and Berenberg
  • Ernst & Young auditors since 2014 and have provided two years of audited results.

Growth Strategies: 

  • Leverage their e-commerce platform to grow the consumer base in each market.
  • Drive consumer adoption and usage through increased consumer education as they continue to strive to deliver a positive online shopping experience
  • Increase the number of sellers and level of seller engagement
  • Develop Jumia Logistics in to better serve consumers and drive economies of scale.
  • Increase the adoption of JumiaPay.  They have agreements, through partners, in Nigeria, Egypt, Ghana, and Ivory Coast to offer JumiaPay, but they don’t offer the full JumiaPay wallet range of services possible, which would require additional eMoney permissions in every country (e.g. Morocco would require €1 million in core capital and €450,000 for Ivory Coast). In Kenya, where they currently operate as a direct lender, they are preparing a new licensing application for JumiaPay.

Risks cited in the Jumia offer:

  • One caution cited is that (US) investors may have difficulty enforcing civil liabilities against us or the members of our management and supervisory board – (as) we are incorporated in Germany and conduct substantially all of our operations in Africa through our subsidiaries.
  • We do not expect to pay any dividends in the foreseeable future.
  • We have broad discretion in the use of the net proceeds from this offering and may not use them effectively.
  • We face competition, which may intensify.  Current competitors include Souq.com in Egypt (affiliated with Amazon), Konga in Nigeria and Takealot, Superbalist and Spree, which are all part of the Naspers group, in South Africa. Also .. some of our competitors currently copy our marketing campaigns, and such competitors may undertake more far-reaching marketing events or adopt more aggressive pricing policies.

€1 = Kshs 115 (Kenya shillings)

EDIT
Nov 19, 2019; Jumia shuts down in Cameroon

Nov 28, 2019; Jumia closed in Tanzania: Regarding Tanzania, Jumia had ceased operations in 2016 and sold four subsidiaries – AIH General Merchandise Tanzania, Juwel 193, ECart Services Tanzania and Juwel E-Services Tanzania to Jeremy Hodara, their co-CEO for €1 each. Later in 2018, he decided to sell the Tanzanian entities, which had revenues of €238,000 thousand and net losses of €3,088,000, and Jumia Facilities (Dubai) bought a 51%, leaving Hodara with 49%.

December 9, 2019: Jumia Food to close Rwanda operations. Jumia will no longer be able to accept cash on delivery and can only process pre-paid orders and no orders will be processed after 9th January 2020 at which point all customer accounts will be closed. (via New Times Rwanda)

December 9, 2019: Jumia Travel to be taken over by Travelstart, part of drastic company changes. (via TechCabal)