Category Archives: East African Community

Economic Forecasts from Citi, Barclays, World Bank, Brookings, Oxford

A roundup of recently published economic forecasts, reports, and surveys.   

AfDBThe African Development Bank’s interactive platform, #MapAfrica, maps the locations of the bank’s investments in every country across Africa.   

Also the AfDB launched their 2018 African Economic Outlook report. 

Barclays: In Nairobi this week, Barclays Africa launches the 2017/18 macro-economic report as well as the Africa Financial Markets Index,  which is a survey of 17 African stock markets.

Citi: Citi Research has just published two reports on frontier markets and one on food inflation in AfricaCiti found that frontier markets did better than developed markets and that Kenya did well (36% return on equities) despite the banking interest cap law and the prolonged election season which has now ended.

Citi’s forecasts of top picks for frontier markets in 2018 are Sri Lanka, Romania, and Kenya and they see weaknesses for Argentina, Morocco, and Egypt. The Citi rankings consider six factors: macro growth, macro imbalances, monetary factors, valuations, earnings momentum and price momentum for their forecasts. Citi also ranked five top stock for frontier markets BGEO Group (Georgia), Humansoft (Kuwait), IDH (Egypt), KCB (Kenya) and MHP (Ukraine). For KCB they like the growth profile of corporate and salaried customers from which the bank will grow market its share even if the banking law remains the same.

The Citi forecasts also looked at the Kenyan currency (shilling) which has remained stable relative to other African currencies and how it will continue to do so even with the country’s balance of payments deficits and heightened politics. But they found that one problem with making Kenya predictions is that a significant portion of inflows that offset the current account deficit is classified as other flows, and their timing is not predictable. They assume that the inflows are from the East and Central Africa region that sees Kenya as a safe haven, despite the politics of the second half of 2017. Another finding was that devaluation of currencies have a bigger impact on food inflation in sub-Saharan Africa but Kenya which had drought and food security issues in 2017 is able to draw on food production from its neighbors (Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda) that keeps food inflation in check even though the food trade data is not captured in official statistics.

World Bank: Meanwhile the World Bank is taking heat after one of their economists admitted that the WB “Doing Business” rankings for Chile had been manipulated for political reasons. The Doing Business reports are cited by leaders of several countries such as Kenya, Rwanda, India as indicators of their good performance in office, But this one admission of political interference could trigger fall out as to the credibility of other reports, country economic forecasts, growth statistics, inflation measures and discussions with governments that the World Bank does.

The Oxford Business Group: The Oxford forecasts reviewed the year Kenya in 2017 in which growth was expected to be about 5% (down from an initial forecast of 5.8% for 2017), but still above the sub-Saharan Africa average of 2.7%. It noted the mixed agriculture performance was due to the drought that affected maize, sugar, tea. Also that Kenya’s Supreme Court decision to nullify the presidential election set a good path for the country in 2018 despite the added cost of staging two elections in 2017 affecting the government’s ability to meet budgetary targets and which later resulted in Moody’s considering a downgrade of Kenya’s debt rating.

Brookings: The Brookings forecasts are contained in Foresight Africa, an Africa-focused report  that celebrates Africa’s growth and highlights priorities for the continent. For Kenya, it contains a sum up of the ability of the country to leverage technology and innovation for things like revenue collection and uptake of products and mobile bonds (M-Akiba), M-Tiba, and IFMIS. It mentions that Kenya can balance the impact of special economic zones and infrastructure from China against politics and that the successful launch of the SGR in May 2017 could one day serve Uganda Rwanda, Burundi and even Tanzania South Sudan and Ethiopia. It has special sections on the 2017 Kenya election and the M-Akiba bond (“The KSh 150.04 million (approximately $1.5 million) uptake of the M-Akiba bond was mainly dominated by small investors who invested less than KSh 10,000 (approximately $100)”)

Kenya’s Money in the Past: Spymaster Memoirs by Bart Kibati

Excerpts from the Memoirs of a Kenyan Spymaster, a unique autobiography by Bart Joseph Kibati who worked in national intelligence for over two decades, where his job was to, with others in the business, identify and analyze threats and advise the government. It is a revealing look at many sectors of his life (he got married the same day that Tom Mboya was shot), Kenya’s transformation in the independence era, the business environment, and the state of security in East Africa and international relations, while serving in two administrations during  which he interacted with Presidents’ Kenyatta and Moi.

Spymaster excerpts

Police & Cattle & Remote areas

  • Cattle rustling by cattle raiders – Ngorokos (former soldier) has long been a feature in Kenya, with Laikipia and Samburu raids spilling over to Turkana, Baringo and Isiolo areas. Suguta Valley where over 40 police were killed in 2012 is a place that police have long avoided going to for years because of the dangers.
  • While the ‘Ngoroko’ plot against Moi, was a myth, it was based a well-intended idea to have an elite fighting unit to chase and deal with bandits.
  • For decades, Lamu’s Boni forest, which is near the Somalia border, has been a hideout for poachers & bandits and this has been sustained by poor policing practices in the area and support by local tribes.

East Africa & Leadership Styles

  • Some keen observations on some of the factors such as economic desires, ideology & actions of leaders  – Kenyatta, Nyerere and Obote/Amin and other political party & government officials in the run-up to why the East Africa community collapsed.
  • Two days after the signing of an East African a treaty in 1963, there were coup attempts in all three EAC countries.
  • To make their decisions, Kenyatta relied on finished intelligence information, while Moi wanted raw information.
  • Moi wanted to know why the Kikuyu hated him and Bart told him about quotas in education and government, and the collapse of their banks (which were rolled into Consolidated Bank) and area infrastructure, to which Moi replied: “How can the government build infrastructure if they ask donors not to release funds?”

Industry & Economy

  • Beach plots allocated by the President and partnership with hoteliers resulted in massive hotel empires at the coast or wealth from selling utility plots – by people around the president.
  • The greed of property developers and corruption of environmental regulators.
  • The government moved to grant duty-free cars to university lecturers in a move to pacify their radical ways.
  • Coffee smuggling from Uganda, through Chepkube, opened the eyes of many people in government, including police, to quick great wealth that could come from corruption.
  • The Numerical Machine Corporation was a success. It just could not shed the ‘Nyayo car’ tag.

Human Resources  & Working in the Government: 

  • When he finished form four at Mangu High School, he had job offers to work at East African Airways, Barclays Bank, the Post Office, Kenyatta University, and also the option to continue his schooling at A levels!
  • The recent repeal of indemnity for security forces (and TJRC) makes it hard to do police work such as combating terror threats and is a demonization of patriots.
  • How colleagues, and politicians scheme to transfer, promote or demote other security staff.
  • There is no pension for older Kenyans who, while experienced, are discarded under the guise that they are preventing youth from getting jobs. It seems the Government hopes they will die soon and stop draining the meagre government pension.
  • There were no successful coups in Kenya due to (long-term spymaster chief) Kanyotu and the Special Branch. The 1982 coup was unnecessary;  It could have been stopped but for a leak and bureaucracy. But Kanyotu was later misled by Pattni into the Goldenberg scam.
  • The more open that national intelligence services become, with things like having a visible head (of tee NIS) and a website, the less effective they have become.
  • Finally, he ends by asking if Kenya is facing more terror attacks, urban crimes, and rural banditry today because the country doesn’t have a functional intelligence collecting unit. Or there’s more reliance on technical intelligence than human intelligence by a demoralized, ethnicized spy unit.

Some revelations in Spymaster are shocking, but many of the stories have been cited elsewhere with different interpretations, and many of the people named have passed on, or circumstances have changed. Also another story elsewhere, quotes Lee Njiru a long time civil servant who says that: (the) Official Secrets Act binds civil servants to keep secrets for 30 years and the period had elapsed and he was now free to share what he knows.

Also read The Birth of an Airline by Owaahh, which narrates from the Spymaster book, about the break-up of East African Airways and the birth of Kenya Airways.

NSE Shares Portfolio August 2017

Compared to six months ago

Comparing performance since February, this portfolio is down 3% mainly due to shares sales, while the while the NSE 20 share index is up 41% from February 2017.

The Stable

 

 

 

 

Atlas —

Bralirwa (Rwanda) ↓

Centum ↑

CIC Insurance ↑

Diamond Trust ↑

KCB ↑

Kenya Airways ↓

NIC ↑

NSE ↑

Stanbic (Uganda) ↑

Unga ↑

Summary:

  • In: None
  • Out: TPS EA (Serena), Fahari I-Reit (Stanlib)
  • Increase: None
  • Decrease: None
  • Best performer: CIC Insurance (up 95% since February) , NSE 84%, Diamond Trust up 77%.
  • Worst performer(s): Bralirwa down -3%, KQ -1%
  • There’s been a surprising resurgence in shares that’s been very quiet, amid the expected decline and investor exists with the August 8 election.
  • Kenya Airways restructuring deal has not yet hit the share price but will dilute shareholders by 95%
  • The surprising Safaricom sale with Vodacom buying out Vodafone
  • Banks are struggling, despite their rising share prices.
  • Disappointment with East Africa: The Vodacom Tanzania IPO stalled until it was opened to foreigners, and it crossed the finish line at with a full subscription after PIC of South Africa made a huge investment to bridge the gap. The Vodacom IPO was not marketed to Kenyans or through local stockbrokers. That said, it has been a struggle holding shares in different East African countries after the welcoming IPO period has passed, with difficulties collecting dividends or selling shares to get money back.

Other portfolio updates from three years and five years ago.

EAVCA: East Africa Private Equity Snapshot

Ahead of the 3rd Annual Private Equity in East Africa Conference, (taking place on June 15 in Nairobi) the East Africa Private Equity & Venture Capital Association (EAVCA) and KPMG East Africa released their second private equity survey showing increased funding and activity, and with a lot more opportunity for deals to be done.

They estimated that of the $4.8 trillion raised between by P/E funds globally between 2007 and 2016, about $28 billion was raised by Africa-focused funds and $2.7 (including $1.1 billion in 2015-2016) had been earmarked for investment activity in East Africa.

This private equity had funded over 115 deals in the period that were included in the survey. Out of these  the 115 deals, 23 were agri-business, 20 were financial services, 13 manufacturing, and 12 FMGC representing 59% of deal volume. The average deal size had also grown to the $10-15 million range, while in the initial survey it was below $5 million.

East Africa Private Equity Survey

Of the 115 deals, Kenya had 72 deals (63% of the total), Tanzania 19, Ethiopia 8, Uganda 12, and Rwanda at 4. Some of the large deals in the survey, by country, include:

Rwanda: Cimerwa – PPC ($69M), Cogebanque ($41M), BPR-Atlas Mara ($20M), Pfunda Tea ($20M)
Uganda: topped by oil deals CNOOC and Total SA (both $1,467 million), Tullow $1,350M, Total $900M, CSquared-Mitsui $100M, Sadolin-Kansai $88M
Ethiopia: National Tobacco – Japan ($510M), Meta Abo-Johnnie Walker ($255M), Dashen-Duet ($90M), Bedele-Heineken ($85M) and Harar-Heineken ($78M), Tullow-Marathon ($50M)
Tanzania: Africa Barrick Gold ($4,781 million), Tanzania – Pavilion ($1,250M), Vodacom ($243M), Export Trading Co ($210M), Millicom-SREI ($86M), Zanzibar Telecom-Millicom ($74M)
Kenya: Safaricom-Vodacom ($2,600 million), Africa Oil-Maersk ($845M), I&M-City Trust ($335M), Ardan-Africa Oil ($329M), Kenya Breweries-EABL $224M, UAP-Old Mutual ($155M), ARM Cement-CDC ($140M), Wananchi ($130M), CMC-AlFuttaim ($127M), Essar ($120M)

P/E operations: There are about 72 funds operating/focused in East Africa (up from 36 in the first survey) with over 300 employees. 89% of the survey respondents have a local presence in East Africa.

Some of the fund companies that responded to the survey include Acumen, Abraaj, AfricInvest, AHL, Ascent, , Catalyst, Centum, CrossBoundary, Grofin, Emerging Capital Partners, Kuramo, Metier, Mkoba, NorFund, Novastar, Phatisa, Pearl Proparco, Swedfund, and TBL Mirror

Returns:  Of  the deals done, survey responders had an average IRR target was 22% while the actual IRR achieved was 19%.  There were 34 exits between 2007 and 2016, with increased recent activity; 2014 (had 7), 2015 (7) and 2016 (6). The preferred mode of exit is sale to a strategic investors (preferred by 78% while this mode accounts for 38% of exits) followed by share buy backs (32%), then sales to another P/E (21%).

Many of the funds in the region are still in early stages, and 54% have made nil returns to their investors. They surveyors estimate there are more opportunities for Africa private equity in health, education, retail, and manufacturing sectors.

Vodacom IPO launched in Tanzania: a Prospectus Peek

Quick note excerpts from the 140-page Vodacom IPO prospectus. There’s even a Swahili version  (PDF) of this Vodacom Tanzania PLC prospectus.

About Vodacom

  • Vodacom Tanzania PLC is a subsidiary of Vodacom Group (South Africa), which in turn is a subsidiary of Vodafone Group Plc (UK). Vodacom Group Limited is the beneficial owner of 82.15% of Vodacom Tanzania. Mirambo Limited directly holds the remaining 17.85%.
  • Vodacom is Tanzania’s leading mobile operator. Market share: Vodacom Tanzania (31% ), Tigo (29%), Airtel (26%), Halotel (7%), Zantel (4%), Smart Telecom (2%), TTCL (1%)
  • In 2016 Vodacom had 12.38 million customers (including 5.4 million active data customers) and an ARPU of TZS 5,972. Vodacom Tanzania has 570 employees, 189 nationwide retail points, in excess of 17,000 freelance distributors and 75,000 mobile money agents.
    Vodacom is part of a “consortium” (with Tigo, Airtel, Zantel) that has constructed about 400 km of metro fibre, in Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Morogoro, Mwanza and Arusha, as well as over 1,300 km of backbone fibre linking the major cities of Dar es Salaam, Dodoma, Arusha and Moshi.
  • Vodacom Tanzania estimates that the total net proceeds from the Vodacom IPO issue of 560 million new shares, after deducting expenses (and assuming that the offer is fully subscribed), will be TZS 469 billion (~$210 million)

Use of proceeds:

  • Vodacom Tanzania intends to apply such net proceeds to:
    (i) The execution of inorganic growth opportunities geared towards growing and maintaining Vodacom Tanzania’s leading market position (elsewhere the prospectus mentions that Vodacom Tanzania may consider mergers, acquisitions or strategic investments),
    (ii) Working capital augmentation for Vodacom Tanzania; and
    (iii) general corporate purposes for Vodacom Tanzania (elsewhere it mentions that part of the Vodacom IPO proceeds will be used to repay loans from the Vodacom Group and Mirambo).

Risks & Regulation

  • (this is a) Forced listing & IPO: The Company converted from a private limited company to a public limited company in November 2016. Following the 2016 Finance Act, all licensed telecommunication operators are to have a minimum local shareholding of 25% of their authorized share capital issued to the public and listed on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE).. penalties may be imposed by TCRA should the IPO not take place within six months from 1 July 2016.

Non-compliance:

  • The Bank of Tanzania allowed Vodacom Tanzania to continue offering Mobile Money Services whilst the license applications are pending (it has applied for Payment System License and will apply for an Electronic Money Issuer License)
  • Vodacom Tanzania is also working on forming a separate M-Pesa corporate entity to comply with regulations.
  • Vodacom Tanzania is working on a project plan to migrate all its Network Operating Centre (NOC) operations to Tanzania to comply with an in-country NOC requirement.
  • Vodacom Tanzania is also working on network optimisation and modernisation initiatives to ensure compliance with Quality of service (QOS) obligations.

Government Moves

  •  Issuance of new licenses: presents a risk to the profitability of the company. The awarding of a new license to a new operator last year saw the advent of an eighth licensee to an already intensively competitive market. 99% of Vodacom Tanzania’s customers are prepaid (But) It is unlikely that there will be a new entrant into the Tanzania telecommunication market. Any new player in the Tanzania market should not pose a significant competitive challenge in the period to 31 March 2018 because of market penetration and lead time to setting up a telecommunication network.
  • Spectrum: Vodacom Tanzania is on record that it requires additional spectrum to meet quality of service requirements (QOS), especially for data services. The decisions taken by the Government on the timing, fees, and allocation of digital dividend and other spectrum will have a major impact on Vodacom Tanzania’s ability to serve its customers,
  • Tax Risks:  “The complex tax environment in Tanzania poses a number of challenges to Vodacom Tanzania.”  Two new taxes going up may affect Vodacom Tanzania’s profitability: Draft amendments to the UCSAF Regulations seek to increase the service levy from 0.3% of service revenue to 1% of service revenue while a draft revision of the Local Government Finances Act (LGFA) proposes an increase in the rate of service levy charged from the current 0.3% to 1.5% of turnover net of value added tax and excise duty for all businesses. The LGFA further proposes to empower local government authorities to impose levies on telecommunication transmission towers.
  • Vodacom Tanzania already has a number of tax matters and litigations that are pending at various appellate levels. Tax litigation with the Tanzania authorities over TZS 100 billion  (~$51m) calculated on issues like undersea fibre, towers, foreign exchange, losses, withholding taxes, VAT, roaming, interconnection licenses capital allowance). There’s also a potential $500 million from a tort conspiracy case over frequency allocation and a half dozen other staff cases.

Performance:

  • Vodacom Tanzania’s audited annual Accounts for the years ended 2014 and 2015 showed a profit before tax was TZS 166 billion in 2014, TZS 78 billion in 2015 (from revenue of TZS 908 billion). For 2016 it was 74 billion in 2016 (from revenue of TZS 923 billion)
  • They project a project a pre-tax profit of TZS 82 billion for March 2017 and  TZS 137 billion for March 2018

Strategies

  • Continue to grow M-Pesa There has been the phenomenal success story of mobile financial services in Tanzania, where Vodacom Tanzania remains the market leader in terms of customer share and has significant brand equity…Vodacom M-Pesa makes up in excess of 20% of Vodacom Tanzania’s service revenues
  • Benefit from Vodafone: Vodacom Tanzania will, however, remain part of the Vodafone Group and will continue to benefit from their scale of operations and expertise.
  • Vodacom Tanzania may consider mergers, acquisitions or strategic investments.

Other Companies

  • In 2016, the Group acquired 100% of Shared Networks Tanzania (SNT) from its shareholders for $15 million
  • The group remains committed to its decision to exit its investment in Helios Towers Tanzania (HTT ), an associate in which the group holds a direct investment of 23.78%. In September 2013, Vodacom Tanzania PLC decided to sell and lease back its passive equipment to HTT.

Vodacom IPO Expenses

Issue expenses are estimated at TZS 7.1 billion (about $3.9 million) and include amounts for the lead advisor and sponsoring broker’s fees (Orbit Securities) TZS 650M, lead receiving bank fees (National Bank of Commerce) TZS 872M, Capital Markets & Securities Authority fees TZS 283M, Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange listing fee of TZS 1 billion, and all authorised collecting agents will share TZS 3.8 billion.

For Investors

  • 560 million new shares (or 25%) are being sold, and all the shares will be listed on the DSE. Vodacom IPO shares will only be sold to Tanzanian citizens and entities incorporated in Tanzania in which Tanzanian citizens have a majority beneficial ownership (no shares for East Africans unlike previous IPO’s in the region)
  • The minimum investment is TZS 85,000, equal to about $38 or KES 3,926. This is for 100 shares at TZS 850, and after that buy in multiple of  10 shares.
  • Buy via phone: Using their phones, Tanzanians can apply for shares through the DSE platform (dialling *150*36#) and also pay for shares via M-Pesa (by dialling *150*00# and entering the business number 236622, and a unique DSE reference number)
  • After the IPO. the public will own 25% alongside (Vodacom and Mirambo), and the dividend policy is to pay out at least 50% of earnings after tax but at the discretion of the board of directors. (31 March 2016 EPS was 34.65 TZS and the group expects to pay dividends of TZS 16.5 billion in FY17.
  • Timetable: The Vodacom IPO opened on 9th March, and closes on 19th April. The results will be announced on April 28, the listing will be on 16 May, and an AGM is scheduled for 1st June 2017.

Will the Vodacom IPO be as successful as the Safaricom IPO was in Kenya a decade ago?  The Vodacom IPO certainly seems to be selling well, attracting lots of first time Tanzania investors, in the first two days.
100 USD equals 223,000 TZS and 100 KES = TZS 2,165.

EDIT August 9 – Official results: Vodacom Tanzania is delighted to announce that the IPO has raised TZS 476,000,085,000 as planned. Of this amount, 60% of the Offer was raised through subscriptions by Tanzania investors and 40% of the Offer from international investors. This is a significant landmark transaction for the country, being the largest IPO in the history of Tanzania’s capital markets and has attracted more than 40,000 Tanzanian investors, most of whom are first time participants in the capital markets in Tanzania.

EDIT Vodacom Tanzania shares started trading on August 15. Shares in Vodacom Tanzania Plc, part of South Africa’s Vodacom Group, rose nearly 6 percent above their issue price in their debut on the Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange on Tuesday.  Vodacom placed 560 million shares at 850 shillings each in Tanzania’s biggest initial public offering (IPO), raising 476 billion Tanzanian shillings ($213 million).